The Role of the World Court Today by Donoghue, Joan E.
Digital Commons @ Georgia Law
Sibley Lecture Series Lectures and Presentations
4-3-2012
The Role of the World Court Today
Joan E. Donoghue
International Court of Justice
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Lectures and Presentations at Digital Commons @ Georgia Law. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Sibley Lecture Series by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ Georgia Law. Please share how you have benefited from this
access For more information, please contact tstriepe@uga.edu.
Repository Citation
Donoghue, Joan E., "The Role of the World Court Today" (2012). Sibley Lecture Series. 82.
https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/lectures_pre_arch_lectures_sibley/82
108TH SIBLEY LECTURE
THE ROLE OF THE WORLD COURT TODAY
Joan E. Donoghue*
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. A BRIEF HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL ADJUDICATION ....... 182
II. THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE ........................... 184
III. CHANGES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INSTITUTIONS ...... 188
IV. THE UNIQUE ROLE OF THE WORLD COURT ......................... 191
* Judge, International Court of Justice. This is the revised text of the 108th Sibley
Lecture, delivered at the School of Law, University of Georgia, Athens, on April 3, 2012.
181
GEORGIA LAWREVIEW
The International Court of Justice (ICJ, also known as the
World Court) is the principal judicial organ of the United Nations
(UN). I have served as a member of the Court for the past two
years. During that time, I have had the opportunity to speak
about the Court and about international law to a variety of
audiences throughout the United States. It is a particular
privilege to deliver the Sibley Lecture here at the University of
Georgia School of Law, an institution that is known for its
commitment to the study of international law and international
relations.
The ICJ has its roots in the notion that adjudication in a world
court can serve as an alternative to war. In the decades since the
Court was established, there have been enormous changes in
international law and institutions. In particular, there are now
many other international courts and tribunals,1 and many other
institutions contribute to the peaceful resolution of disputes. 2
In view of these developments, what is the role of the World
Court? The ICJ is charged with a powerful combination of
functions: the resolution of particular disputes between states; the
issuance of advisory opinions requested by the United Nations
Security Council and General Assembly; and the development of
international law. This combination of functions, vested in a court
which can hear cases from any region of the world, which has the
scope to consider all substantive aspects of international law, and
which is endowed with the stature of the UN's principal judicial
organ gives the World Court a unique and potent role in the
peaceful resolution of disputes.
I. A BRIEF HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL ADJUDICATION
The world has been comprised of nation-states for centuries, but
it was only at the turn of the twentieth century that the idea of an
international court gained traction. Before that, there had been a
few situations in which two nations asked arbitrators to settle a
specific dispute. At the very end of the nineteenth century,
I In these remarks, I use the terms "court' and "tribunal" interchangeably.
2 See infra text accompanying notes 33-35.
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however, there were calls within Europe and the United States for
the establishment of an international court with more general
jurisdiction. 3
This led to the first Hague Peace Conference in 1899, where the
notion of a World Court was advanced. 4 A primary impetus for a
world court was the vision that nations would take their disputes
to this court instead of going to war with each other. The breadth
and depth of that vision may now seem rather utopian, but the
idea of adjudication as a means for nations to resolve their
disputes without going to war persists today. Indeed, adjudication
is one means of advancing a core goal of international law-the
peaceful settlement of disputes between states.5
The initiative that took form at the Hague Peace Conference in
1899 eventually led to the creation of the Permanent Court of
International Justice (PCIJ) in 1920, established under the auspices
of the League of Nations and housed in the Peace Palace in The
Hague, which is the seat of government of the Netherlands.6
In 1945, when the UN was established, the PCIJ was dissolved
and replaced with the International Court of Justice. The UN
Charter established the ICJ as the principal judicial organ of the
United Nations. 7 Both courts are known as the "World Court," and
there is considerable continuity of jurisprudence and procedure.
3 Succinct summaries of the origins of the World Court, with particular attention to the
evolution of U.S. Government perspectives, can be found in THOMAS M. FRANCK, JUDGING
THE WORLD COURT 13-25 (1986) and Sean D. Murphy, The United States and the
International Court of Justice: Coping with Antinomies, in THE SWORD AND THE SCALES:
THE UNITED STATES AND INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND TRIBUNALS 46, 58-69 (Cesare P.R.
Romano ed., 2009).
4 David Caron has called the International Court of Justice the "inheritor of the belief
that a permanent court occupies a central place in any international system of order."
David D. Caron, War and International Adjudication: Reflections on the 1899 Peace
Conference, 94 AM. J. INT'L L. 4, 5 (2000).
5 The peaceful settlement of disputes is a central tenet of the Charter of the United
Nations. See U.N. Charter arts. 1-2, 33-38.
6 Several documents related to the establishment of the PCIJ are available on the
International Court of Justice website. See Other Documents Concerning the Permanent
Court of International Justice, INT'L COURT OF JUSTICE, http://www.icj-cij.org/pcij/other-
documents.php?p1=9&p2=8 (last visited Sept. 11, 2012).
7 U.N. Charter art. 92.
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The PCIJ was innovative in two important respects, and these
carry forward to the current World Court. First, the PCIJ was a
standing court, not an ad hoc tribunal constituted for a particular
case. Second, states could agree in advance to submit future,
unknown cases to the World Court and could be held to that
decision. Thus, the PCIJ was created by and was accountable to
the broader community of nations, not just to the states that were
parties to a particular dispute.
From the outset, there were competing views about the goals
and desirability of such a world court. The proponents hoped that
a world court could serve as an alternative to war. Others were
skeptical that a court could achieve this goal and questioned the
desirability of a world court.8 Much of this debate carries over to
present-day conversations about the ICJ, particularly within the
United States. There continue to be some strong voices in favor of
strengthening the mechanisms for international adjudication.
Others are critical, taking the view that international courts like
the ICJ have been ineffective and arguing that it is unwise for
governments to submit to their jurisdiction.9
II. THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE
The ICJ is the principal judicial organ of the United Nations. 10
It is comprised of fifteen judges from around the world, no more
8 See Murphy, supra note 3, at 59-61. Concerns raised by the United States and other
states resulted in a conscious effort to balance the objective of "an impartial, permanent
judicial forum" with "the desire of states to control their exposure to ICJ decision making."
Id. at 60-61.
9 There is an extensive body of literature about adjudication in the ICJ and other
international courts and the relative merits of different international judicial bodies. For
an introduction to this literature, see, e.g., John B. Bellinger III, International Courts and
Tribunals and the Rule of Law, in THE SWORD AND THE SCALES, supra note 3, at 1, 2-6;
Cesare P.R. Romano, The United States and International Courts: Getting the Cost-Benefit
Analysis Right, in THE SWORD AND THE SCALES, supra note 3, at 419, 442-44; Monroe Leigh
& Stephen D. Ramsey, Confidence in the Court: It Need Not Be a "Hollow Chamber," in THE
INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE AT A CROSSROADS 106 (Lori Fisler Damrosch, ed., 1987);
Richard Bilder, Possibilities for Development of New International Judicial Mechanisms, 26
STUD. TRANSNAT'L LEGAL POL'Y 317 (1994); Gary Born, A New Generation of International
Adjudication, 61 DUKE L.J. 775, 800-15 (2012).
10 U.N. Charter art. 92.
184 [Vol. 47:181
2012] THE ROLE OF THE WORLD COURT TODAY 185
than one from each country." The judges are nominated in their
home countries and then are elected by the United Nations
Security Council and General Assembly. 12 The members of the
Court are required to be independent of their governments.
13
The ICJ decides two kinds of cases. First, the Court has the
authority to issue advisory opinions at the request of UN organs.14
For example, in 2010, the Court issued an opinion in response to a
request from the United Nations General Assembly, which asked
the Court whether the Kosovo declaration of independence was in
accordance with international law.15 This advisory function may
seem unusual to U.S.-trained lawyers accustomed to the case and
controversy requirement in Article III of the U.S. Constitution.16
Most of the Court's caseload (about 80 percent), however, has
been in a second category--cases between states that are known as
"contentious cases," which will be the focus of these remarks.
These cases resemble civil cases in U.S. courts, in the sense that
one party-always a state' 7-- pursues a case against another state.
The International Court of Justice does not decide criminal cases
involving the prosecution of individual defendants.
Here are some examples of contentious cases, drawn from the
Court's current docket:
0 In March 2012, the Court held a hearing in a case
in which Belgium alleged that Senegal violated its
obligation to "extradite or prosecute" the former
President of Chad, who allegedly committed
numerous crimes while in office.' 8
1 Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 3(1), June 26, 1945, 59 STAT. 1055, 3
Bevans 1179 [hereinafter ICJ Statute].
12 Id. art. 4(1).
13 Id. arts. 16, 20.
14 Id. art. 65(1).
15 Accordance with International Law of Unilateral Declaration of Independence in
Respect of Kosovo, Advisory Opinion (July 22, 2010), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/dock
et/files/141/15987.pdf.
16 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
17 ICJ Statute, supra note 11, art. 34(1).
18 Since the delivery of these remarks, the Court has issued a judgment ordering Senegal
to submit the case to its authorities for prosecution, if it does not extradite the defendant.
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* Australia has brought a case claiming that Japan's
program of whaling in the Antarctic violates the
International Convention on the Regulation of
Whaling. 19
* We have a number of pending cases in which we
are asked to settle boundary disputes.20 These
have been a mainstay of the World Court
throughout its history. That is not surprising.
Boundary disputes often spark armed conflicts,
and disagreements about boundaries often have a
large legal component, such as divergent
interpretations of a boundary treaty or of the law
of the sea.
* Ecuador has brought a case against Colombia
alleging that it has been harmed by aerial
spraying of herbicides by Colombia, as part of
Colombia's anti-coca program.21
These examples illustrate that the ICJ is seized with cases on a
wide variety of topics within international law, from all regions of
the world.
As previously noted, the ICJ was created in the UN Charter
and is the UN's principal judicial organ.22 But the UN Charter
does not give the ICJ automatic jurisdiction over contentious
cases. Instead, the ICJ has jurisdiction in a contentious case only
if a state consents to that jurisdiction. There are two ways for a
state to consent to the jurisdiction of the ICJ in advance of a
particular dispute.
See Questions Relating to Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite (Belg. v. Sen.), Judgment
(July 20, 2012), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/144/17064.pdf.
19 Whaling in Antarctic (Austl. v. Japan), Application (May 31, 2010), available at http://
www icj-cij.org/docket/files/148/15951.pdf.
20 See, e.g., Maritime Dispute (Peru v. Chile), Application (Jan. 16, 2008), available at http://
www.icj-cij.org/dockettfiles/137/14385.pdf; Boundary Dispute (Burk. Faso v. Niger), Special
Agreement (July 20, 2010), available at http:llwww.icj-cij.org/docket/files/149/5985.pdf.
21 Aerial Herbicide Spraying (Ecuador v. Colom.), Application (Mar. 31, 2008), available
at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/138/14474.pdf.
22 See supra note 6.
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First, some states accept the Court's compulsory jurisdiction as
a general matter, meaning that they agree in advance that the
Court has jurisdiction over cases against them.23 At the moment,
there are sixty-seven states that have accepted compulsory
jurisdiction in this way, under what is often called the "optional
clause" of the ICJ's Statute.24 States have the option of consenting
to jurisdiction unconditionally, or they can exclude certain kinds of
disputes. The United States accepted the compulsory jurisdiction
of the Court in 1946, albeit with a number of significant
reservations, but withdrew that form of consent in the mid-1980s,
citing its dissatisfaction with the Court's handling of the case that
Nicaragua had brought against the United States.25
There is a second way for states to accept the Court's jurisdiction
in advance. Certain treaties give the Court jurisdiction over
categories of disputes. Many treaties contain provisions called
compromissory clauses in which the parties to the treaty agree on a
mechanism for resolving disputes under that particular treaty.26
Some of these provisions specify that the ICJ will have jurisdiction
to decide those disputes. There are numerous treaties with such
provisions. For example, the United States invoked the
compromissory clauses of several treaties as the basis for the ICJ's
jurisdiction when it brought a successful case against Iran for the
holding of U.S. hostages.27 The United States remains a party to
213 ICJ Statute, supra note 11, art. 36(2).
24 For a list of States that have submitted declarations recognizing the jurisdiction of the
Court as compulsory, see http://www.icj-cij.orgjurisdiction/index.php?pl=5&p2=1&p3=3
(last visited Oct. 11, 2012).
21 See Murphy, supra note 3, at 65-68 (citing sources). For an insightful discussion of the
implications of the Nicaragua case, see Lori Fisler Damrosch, The Impact of the Nicaragua
Case on the Court and Its Role: Harmful, Helpful, or In Between?, 25 LEIDEN J. INT'L L. 135
(2012).
26 See ICJ Statute, supra note 11, art. 36(1). While compromissory clauses only address
jurisdiction over disputes arising under the particular treaty, there are other treaties on the
resolution of disputes in which parties accept the Court's jurisdiction more broadly. Well-
known examples are the American Treaty on Pacific Settlement (Pact of Bogot), April 30,
1948, 30 U.N.T.S. 55, and the European Convention on the Peaceful Settlement of Disputes,
April 29, 1957, 320 U.N.T.S. 243.
27 United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (U.S. v. Iran), 1980 I.C.J. 3, 24
(May 24), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/64/6291.pdf; see also Application of
United States, United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (U.S. v. Iran), 1982
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many treaties that provide a basis for ICJ jurisdiction. 28 Since the
mid-1980s, however, it largely has avoided compromissory clauses
that would make ICJ jurisdiction mandatory. 29
It is also possible for a state to consent to the Court's
jurisdiction with respect to a particular, known dispute. Most
frequently, this takes the form of a "special agreement," in which
two countries jointly ask the ICJ to settle a dispute. 30
Because the Court's jurisdiction depends on the consent of the
parties to a dispute, the question whether the Court has
jurisdiction in a particular case is an important and fundamental
one. To remain faithful to its mandate, the Court must hold states
to the consent that they have given. It is equally important,
however, that the Court not go beyond such consent.
The provisions governing the structure of the ICJ and the basis
for its jurisdiction are not easily changed. As is the case for the
UN Charter, the procedure to amend the ICJ Statute requires the
approval of two-thirds of UN members, including all five
permanent members of the Security Council. 31  The various
proposals to update and reform the UN have not included a call to
change the ICJ into a court that has automatic jurisdiction over all
UN member states. The track record as to optional clause
jurisdiction suggests that such a proposal would not attract
sufficient support to be adopted.
III. CHANGES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INSTITUTIONS
While the basic structural framework for the ICJ has remained
constant since its establishment just after World War II, the
I.C.J. Pleadings 1, 4-5 (Nov. 29, 1979), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/64/95
45 (discussing treaties that vest the ICJ with jurisdiction over the case).
28 See Murphy, supra note 3, at 99-111 (listing treaties to which the United States is a
party that provide for ICJ jurisdiction); David J. Scheffer, Non-Judicial State Remedies and
the International Court of Justice, 27 STAN. J. INT'L L. 83, 89-90 (1990) (concluding that the
United States remained a party to more than seventy bilateral and multilateral treaties
providing for ICJ jurisdiction even after it withdrew its "optional clause" declaration).
29 See Murphy, supra note 3, at 65, 67-68 (explaining the decision by the United States to
terminate its acceptance of the Court's compulsory jurisdiction in 1985).
30 ICJ Statute, supra note 11, art. 36(2).
31 Id. art. 69; U.N. Charter art. 108.
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broader world of international law has changed tremendously
during that same period.
The starting point is that there now are many more states. 32
International law is no longer largely the province of Europe and
the United States. Moreover, the reach of international law is
much broader and deeper. Traditionally, international law
governed the relations among states. In recent decades, the field
has expanded to impose obligations on states to protect the rights
of their own people, especially with the development of
international human rights law. In addition, national courts
interpret and apply international law in various circumstances.
And finally, public international law now covers a much broader
range of topics-including fields such as international
environmental law and international trade law.
Of special relevance to today's topic is another huge change-
the emergence of many new international players, including
international organizations and a variety of visible and active non-
governmental organizations. In particular, there are, today, many
international courts. The international adjudication section of the
international law textbook from which I studied at Boalt Hall
School of Law in 1979 mentioned, in addition to the ICJ, only three
other courts-two European courts and another regional court that
was already defunct at that time.33 Things have changed. The
count varies, but it is fair to say that there are more than twenty
standing international courts and tribunals today. If one includes
all of the quasi-judicial and arbitral bodies, the number is closer to
ninety.34
One important group of courts is the international criminal
courts, all created after 1990. These include: the International
Criminal Court and the International Tribunal for the Former
32 With the admission of South Sudan on July 14, 2011, there are currently 193 Member
States of the United Nations. See http://www.un.org/en/members/index.shtml (last visited
Oct. 11, 2012).
33 NOYES E. LEECH, COVEY T. OLIVER & JOSEPH MODESTE SWEENEY, CASES AND
MATERIALS ON THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM 79 (1973).
34 For a snapshot of this panoply of dispute resolution bodies, see The International
Judiciary in Context, THE PROJECT ON INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND TRIBUNALS, http://
www.pict-pcti.org/publications/synopticchart/synop-c4.pdf (Nov. 2004).
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Yugoslavia, both of which are based in The Hague, as well as the
International Tribunal for Rwanda, based in Tanzania. Two other
criminal tribunals based in The Hague are the Special Tribunal for
Lebanon and the Special Court for Sierra Leone. In each of these
courts, and in contrast to the ICJ, a prosecutor pursues a case
against an individual defendant alleged to have committed crimes
within the mandate of that particular court.
There are also other courts that, like the ICJ, decide cases in
which one state brings a case against another. Two important
examples are the Dispute Settlement Body of the World Trade
Organization and the International Tribunal for the Law of the
Sea. These tribunals and others are specialized by region, by
topic, or both. This specialization distinguishes them from the
ICJ, which is a global court that has the scope to consider
questions on any aspect of international law.
Another important category comprises international courts
before which individuals appear to bring cases against states.
Notable examples are the European Court of Human Rights, the
Inter-American Court of Human Rights, and the African Court of
Human and Peoples' Rights. In addition, under treaties such as
the North American Free Trade Agreement and numerous
bilateral investment treaties, tribunals may be established in
order to decide cases brought by an investor against a state.
Finally, the institutional mechanisms for tackling disputes
raising questions of international law are not limited to courts and
tribunals. For example, in recent decades, other specialized quasi-
adjudicatory bodies have appeared, including those in the fields of
the environment and human rights, that seek to promote the
effectiveness of international norms and adherence to those norms
without formal, judicial proceedings.35
This overview of judicial and quasi-judicial bodies makes clear
that the world community not only continues to find value in
judicial resolution of various kinds of disputes but also that we
have moved from the idea of a single world court to what might be
described as a menu of dispute resolution mechanisms. One might
35 See generally RUTH MACKENZIE ET AL., MANUAL ON INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND
TRIBUNALS 415-60, 501-13 (2010).
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suspect that all of these other institutions have crowded out the
ICJ. What is interesting, however, is that, in parallel with the
creation and development of a considerable number of other courts
and quasi-adjudicatory bodies, the docket of the ICJ has not
contracted. Instead, in the past decade, the Court has been very
active-busier, in fact, than it was at some earlier periods where
there were fewer other courts and tribunals available to states.
And the list of states accepting the Court's jurisdiction is also not
static. The most recent acceptance of the Court's compulsory
jurisdiction was that of the Republic of Ireland in 2011.36
IV. THE UNIQUE ROLE OF THE WORLD COURT
Keeping in mind the original purposes of the ICJ, the kinds of
disputes that the Court decides, and the many courts and
tribunals that now exist alongside the ICJ, I turn now to the
central question posed by today's lecture: what is the role of the
ICJ today?
To this end, I would like to look a bit more closely at two core
functions of the World Court. First, the Court decides particular
legal disputes between states. Second, the Court's jurisprudence
performs a "law-making" function through elaborating and
clarifying international law.3 7
I turn first to the role that the Court plays in the resolution of a
particular legal dispute. What exactly does the Court do when it
decides a contentious case? We can begin to answer this question
by enumerating some of the particular features of ICJ
adjudication:
36 See supra note 24.
37 The fact that these two functions are difficult to disentangle heightens the importance
of these dual responsibilities:
[T]he Court has a particular responsibility to provide clear and detailed
reasons for its conclusions .... This becomes all the more important where
the case it is deciding has important implications in other matters before
other courts, whether national or international, and where the Court is
assuming a law development function.
Philippe Sands, What is the 1CJ For?, 35 REVuE BELGE DE DROIT INT'L 537, 544-45 (2002).
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* The Court issues a legal decision. If the
disagreement between the parties is not a legal
dispute, the Court has no jurisdiction.
* The Court's judgment, including the remedy that
it imposes, is binding on the parties.
* The decision of the ICJ is not subject to appeal.
* The resolution of a dispute in the ICJ is highly
structured and often is quite slow. The pace can
be frustrating in some cases, but at times it can
contribute to resolution of the underlying dispute.
* Adjudication in the ICJ provides a public setting
in which to air the state's legal and factual case.
By contrast, arbitration is sometimes private. For
some, but not all, disputes, a public forum may
advance the resolution of the dispute. 38
I will not attempt here a comprehensive comparison between
ICJ dispute resolution and dispute settlement in other settings,
such as arbitration.39 Rather, I ask you to reflect on the dominant
image that emerges from the features of ICJ adjudication that I
just reviewed-a picture of a tripartite relationship comprised of
the two states that are parties to a legal dispute and a third party
that is settling the dispute. To gain a fuller appreciation of the
role of the ICJ in resolving a particular legal dispute, however, we
need to look beyond this triangle and leave the confines of the
Peace Palace.
The ICJ must be seen as one component of a larger
international legal system, one that is loosely integrated, complex,
and sometimes bewildering and that differs markedly from
national legal systems. In many situations, the role of the ICJ in
settling specific disputes is best understood when the Court is seen
as one actor within a set of nested and overlapping institutions
38 See Richard Bilder, International Dispute Settlement and the Role of International
Adjudication, 1 EMORY J. INT'L DIsP. RESOL. 131, 146-65 (1987) (enumerating the
characteristics of international adjudication).
39 For such a discussion, see Loretta Malintoppi, Methods of Dispute Resolution in Inter-
State Litigation: When States Go To Arbitration Rather Than Adjudication, 5 L. & PRAC.
INT'L COURTS AND TRIBUNALS 133 (2006).
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comprising the international legal system. After all, the UN
Charter not only established a principal judicial organ, but it also
set up other UN organs, including the Security Council and the
General Assembly. And as we have just seen, many new
institutions have blossomed in the intervening decades-both
inside and outside of the UN system. Some have been comprised
of governments, while others have been independent of them.
National courts can also play an important role in addressing some
disputes arising under international law.
Thus, the contribution of the World Court to the peaceful
resolution of particular disputes is measured not by considering it
in isolation from other institutions, or in competition with them,
but rather by evaluating it as a part of a larger web of institutions.
To illustrate this point, I want to focus on what happens after
the ICJ renders a judgment. Often, that question is framed in a
binary manner: did the losing state comply or not? The answer is
not always straightforward. There can be differing views, for
example, about what the judgment requires and the time frame for
compliance. 40 More importantly, I am convinced that we do not get
a complete picture of the role of an ICJ judgment in the settlement
of a dispute if we focus solely on compliance. For a more robust
understanding of the Court's contribution, we must ask a more
open-ended question: what role does the judgment of the ICJ play
in the peaceful resolution of a particular dispute between two
parties?
By looking beyond compliance, we more accurately reflect the
fact that the parties in cases before the ICJ are states represented
40 Scholars who have studied compliance with judgments of the World Court have used
varied approaches and methodologies-and have reached disparate conclusions. See, e.g.,
CONSTANZE SCHULTE, COMPLIANCE WITH DECISIONS OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF
JUSTICE 6-17 (2004); Jonathan I. Charney, Disputes Implicating the Institutional
Credibility of the Court: Problems of Non-Appearance, Non-Participation, and Non-
Performance, in THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE AT A CROSSROADS, supra note 9, at
288, 293-302; Tom Ginsburg & Richard H. McAdams, Adjudicating in Anarchy: An
Expressive Theory of International Dispute Resolution, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1229 (2004);
Colter Paulson, Compliance with Final Judgments of the International Court of Justice
Since 1987, 98 AM. J. INT'L L. 434, 436-56, 460 (2004); Aloysius P. Llamzon, Jurisdiction
and Compliance in Recent Decisions of the International Court of Justice, 18 EUR. J. INT'L L.
815, 822-23, 844-46 (2007).
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by national governments. 41 The litigators standing before the
Court in the Peace Palace might define their goal as winning a
court case, but governments are not law firm litigation
departments. A government's response to a judgment takes into
account a broad range of factors. 42 These might include, for
example: the overall relationship between the two disputing
parties; constraints that flow from a party's national legal system
(e.g., the need to enact new laws in order to give effect to an ICJ
judgment); domestic political sensitivities; and resource
considerations. Even before a judgment of the ICJ, third states
and international institutions may have had an interest or role in
the resolution of the underlying dispute. The judgment provides
an opportunity for such institutions to engage with the disputants
on the basis of the Court's binding pronouncements about the legal
issues, rather than the parties' disparate contentions.
To illustrate this more robust framework for evaluation of the
effects of a judgment on a particular dispute, I'd like to offer one
example. In 2002, the ICJ issued a judgment that defined
maritime and land boundaries between Nigeria and Cameroon. At
issue were important and large areas of territory and waters.
Armed conflict in the disputed areas had caused a number of
deaths.43
In its 2002 judgment, the ICJ awarded significant areas of land
to Cameroon, including an area called the Bakassi Peninsula
41 This broader inquiry is sometimes described as a question of "effectiveness," introducing
a useful concept, albeit one that invites another set of doctrinal and methodological debates,
including, for example, the need to specify the goals as to which the institution is judged as
being effective. See generally Yuval Shany, Assessing the Effectiveness of International Courts:
A Goal-Based Approach, 106 AM. J. INT'L L. 225 (2012).
42 As Harold Hongju Koh has observed, the reason why nations obey international law
"remains among the most perplexing questions in international relations." Harold Hongju
Koh, Why Do Nations Obey International Law?, 106 YALE L.J. 2599, 2599 (1997). Koh's
essay provides a comprehensive overview of the vast literature related to this question.
43 Land and Maritime Boundary Between Cameroon and Nigeria, 2002 I.C.J. 303, 312
(Oct. 10), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/94/7453.pdf. Professor Malcolm
Shaw called attention to this case and its aftermath in the inaugural Shabtai Rosenne
Memorial Lecture given in The Hague on November 24, 2011. See Malcolm Shaw, QC,
Inaugural Shabtai Rosenne Memorial Lecture: Peaceful Settlement of Disputes: Paradigms,
Plurality and Policy (Nov. 24, 2011).
[Vol. 47:181194
2012] THE ROLE OF THE WORLD COURT TODAY
where a large number of Nigerians lived.44 The Court ordered
each party to withdraw from territory that the ICJ had assigned to
the other party and to withdraw its military, police, and
administrative personnel "expeditiously and without condition.
45
Soon thereafter, Nigeria's President made worrisome statements,
implying that Nigeria "neither accepts nor rejects" the judgment,
invoking federalism concerns that resonate in the United States.46
Two years later, one study of compliance with ICJ decisions
declined to put this case in the "compliance" category because
Nigeria had not relinquished control of territory, including the
Bakassi Peninsula.47  The formal transfer of authority over
Bakassi began in 2006 and was completed in 2008.48 And only
now in 2012, ten years after the judgment, are the parties
finishing the work of demarcating the boundary. 49
Some would look at this sequence of events and say, "that's
obviously non-compliance with an order to withdraw
expeditiously." But let's look at the situation not through the
narrow lens of compliance with a decision, but in a broader context
that includes the active engagement of various institutions and
international actors. Even before the ICJ rendered its judgment,
for example, the United Nations Secretary-General convened the
heads of states of the two parties to encourage them to organize a
commission to implement the ICJ's judgment. Soon after the ICJ's
judgment, the parties set up an ad hoc mixed commission, under
the leadership of a representative of the Secretary-General, that
gave rise to a series of bilateral agreements that set the timetable
for the turnover of land to Cameroon and also included pledges by
Cameroon to treat Nigerians fairly.50 The parties agreed on
44 Id. at 455.
45 Id. at 451-52.
46 Llamzon, supra note 40, at 836.
47 See Ginsburg & McAdams, supra note 40, at 1310, 1337.
48 See Press Release, Secretary-General, Agreement Transferring Authority Over
Bakassi Peninsula from Nigeria to Cameroon 'Triumph for the Rule of Law," Secretary-
General Says in Message for Ceremony, U.N. Press Release SG/SM/11745 (Aug. 14, 2008),
available at http://www.un.orgtNews/Presstdocs/2008/sgsm11745.doc.htm.
49 U.N. Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General on the Activities of the United
Nations Office for West Africa, 45, U.N. Doc. S/2012/510 (June 29, 2012).
50 See Press Release, Secretary-General, Nigeria, Cameroon Sign Agreement Ending
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detailed monitoring mechanisms. The various stages of the
transition to Cameroonian sovereignty proceeded slowly, but they
proceeded peacefully. 51
To me, this is not a disappointing story about non-compliance,
but rather is an encouraging story that demonstrates the inter-
linkages among international processes and institutions, all
contributing to the peaceful resolution of a dispute. The binding
pronouncements of the UN's principal judicial organ on the legal
aspects of the dispute gave substantive direction to the parties,
while other institutions worked with the parties on political and
technical aspects of the dispute. 52
So, bearing in mind this broader conception of the role of the
Court in settling a particular dispute, I'd like to turn next to the
ICJ's role of clarifying and developing substantive international
law. The Court has exercised this function not only when it
decides contentious cases but also in its advisory opinions. Indeed,
some of the Court's most controversial pronouncements on
international law have appeared in advisory opinions.53
This law-developing function of the World Court is one of the
most important consequences of the move from ad hoc tribunals
accountable to the disputing states to a standing, community court
Decades-Old Border Dispute; Sets Procedures for Nigerian Withdrawal from Bakassi
Peninsula, U.N. Press Release AFR/1397 (June 12, 2006), available at http://www.un.org!
News/Press/docs/2006/afr1397.doc.htm.
51 For a description of the mandate and activities of the Cameroon-Nigeria Mixed
Commission, see Cameroon /Nigeria Mixed Commission, http://unowa.unmissions.org/Defa
ult.aspx?tabid=804 (last visited Sept. 11, 2012).
52 Regarding the Cameroon-Nigeria border dispute, there is considerable material that
one can examine to understand what has taken place since the ICJ's judgment. Often,
however, it is difficult to find complete and reliable information about what happens after
the ICJ or another international court renders a decision. What institutions and factors
play a role in implementing a particular decision or impeding compliance? Can we draw
any conclusions about the kinds of remedies that are either effective or ineffective? More
scholarly work and information-sharing is needed on such topics.
53 See, e.g., Legal Consequences of Construction of a Wall in Occupied Palestinian
Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 136 (July 9), available at http://www.icj-cij.orgdoc
ket/files131/1671.pdf; Legality of Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion,
1996 I.C.J. 226 (July 8), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docketlfiles/95/7495.pdf.
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with a prospective and open-ended docket. It is also an especially
delicate element of the ICJ's role. 54
International law, like domestic law, is not always precise and
clear, so the need for interpretation and elaboration by the ICJ is
inevitable. In many cases, the Court faces sensitive questions
about whether to address legal questions narrowly or broadly. As
with the decisions the Court makes on jurisdiction, the Court's
substantive pronouncements on the meaning and content of
international law, the quality and clarity of its reasoning, and the
procedures it follows influence the way that members of the world
community view the World Court.55
A judgment of the ICJ does not bind anyone other than the
parties to a case,56 but the impact within the community of
international lawyers is profound. And reactions to the Court's
judgments are also varied. Those who dislike a particular result,
or the Court's approach more generally, sometimes seek to
discredit a judgment or the Court itself. Within the United States,
there is a strain of scholarship that paints an unfavorable picture
of the ICJ, arguing, for example, that its judgments are a product
of national bias by judges.57
54 See, e.g., William H. Taft, IV, Self-Defense and the Oil Platforms Decision, 29 YALE J.
INT'L L. 295, 306 (2004), in which the Legal Adviser of the U.S. State Department criticizes
the Court's judgment in the Oil Platforms case [Oil Platforms (Iran v. U.S.) 2003 I.C.J. 161
(Nov. 6)] for addressing the law of self-defense, although it was not necessary to the
resolution of the dispute, and asserts that the Court's judgment "suggest[s] new and
unsupported limitations on the ability of States to defend themselves from armed attacks."
55 See generally Christopher G. Weeramantry, Constitutional and Institutional
Developments: The Function of the International Court of Justice in the Development of
International Law, 10 LEIDEN J. INT'L L. 309 (1997).
56 ICJ Statute, supra note 11, art. 59.
57 On the question of impartiality, compare Eric A. Posner, The International Court of
Justice: Voting and Usage Statistics, 99 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 130, 131 (2005) (citing Eric
A. Posner & Miguel F. P. de Figueiredo, Is the International Court of Justice Biased?, 34 J.
LEGAL STUD. 599 (2005)) (asserting that statistical analysis reveals national biases among
ICJ judges and may explain an alleged decline in recourse to the ICJ) and Eric A. Posner,
The Decline of the International Court of Justice 10-11 (Univ. of Chi. John M. Olin Law &
Econ. Working Paper No. 233, 2004), available at http://papers.ssrn.comsol3/papers.cfm?a
bstractid=629341 (attributing a "decline" in the Court's output to the alleged impartiality
of its judges) with Rosalyn Higgins, Remarks by Rosalyn Higgins, 99 AM. SOC. INT'L L.
PROC. 135 (2005) (pointing to factual errors, methodological shortcomings, and
misunderstandings about the Court's work in the statistical analysis by Posner and de
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The law-shaping function of the ICJ is not limited to the specific
pronouncements about international law that appear in its
judgments and opinions. The existence of the Court also
percolates in the background of national decision-making. The
prospect of adjudication in the ICJ might at times constrain
behavior, but it also might strengthen the confidence of a leader
who concludes that a proposed course of action would receive a
favorable reaction in the ICJ. Moreover, this influence on national
decision-making is not limited to disputes as to which a state has
accepted ICJ jurisdiction. Although a state may be convinced that
the ICJ would not have jurisdiction over a particular dispute, its
officials know that many observers will give great weight-
perhaps even dispositive weight-to relevant ICJ jurisprudence.
Thus, even if a state does not appear before the ICJ to address a
particular legal issue, it can be expected to defend and explain its
conduct with reference to the ICd's jurisprudence. In a world in
which all but a few international legal disputes are debated and
resolved outside of a courtroom, this widespread practice of
measuring the legality of state conduct with reference to ICJ
jurisprudence gives the Court's judgments especially long
tentacles.
Of course, pronouncements by the World Court are not the only
means by which international law is refined and developed. States
and other actors interpret and apply international law every day
and, in so doing, shape the content of customary international law
in particular. Treaties are constantly being negotiated. And the
UN's International Law Commission makes valuable contributions
Figueiredo). On the more general question whether the ICJ and other international courts
are effective, compare Eric A. Posner & John C. Yoo, Judicial Independence in International
Tribunals, 93 CAL. L. REV. 1, 34-41 (2005) (asserting that usage of the ICJ "has never
reached a significant level" and that the Court suffers from chronic non-compliance, except
where jurisdiction is based on special agreement) with Laurence R. Helfer & Anne-Marie
Slaughter, Why States Create International Tribunals: A Response to Professors Posner and
Yoo, 93 CAL. L. REV. 899, 955 (2005) (finding that empirical evidence does not support the
conclusion that "independent" international courts and tribunals are less effective than
"dependent" tribunals, where judges are closely controlled by the governments appearing
before them). See also Eric A. Posner & John C. Yoo, Reply to Helfer and Slaughter, 93 CAL.
L. REV. 957, 972 (2005) (concluding that the ICJ at least has been "a failure" because judges
have pursued "agendas different from those of the states that set up and use the ICJ").
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through its studies and draft articles. In addition, international
courts and tribunals other than the ICJ also develop the law, within
their particular mandates. Nonetheless, in the words of one
commentator: "[A]s the judicial wing of the United Nations, the
Court stands as the most authoritative Court for the interpretation
of general rules of international law, with its decisions regularly
cited by other global, regional, and national courts."58
One recent case illustrates the broad reach of the ICJ's law-
developing function. In February, the Court issued a decision that
held that judgments rendered by Italian courts against Germany
violated Germany's sovereign immunity. There was no applicable
treaty, so the Court reached this conclusion by interpreting and
applying customary international law.59 As the Court noted, ten
states have legislation governing this issue.60 In almost all states,
therefore, national courts decide whether a foreign state is
immune from suit by applying customary international law. (For
example, the United States regularly invokes customary
international law to assert immunity when it is sued in foreign
courts. 61) After the Court's decision in Germany v. Italy, we can
expect the Court's statements regarding the scope and content of
customary international law governing foreign sovereign
immunity to be a key starting point for national courts.
In this single judgment of the Court, then, one can see the two
functions of the ICJ on which I have focused in these remarks: the
Court settled a specific dispute between Germany and Italy and, in
so doing, made pronouncements about customary international
law that will have global implications.
As I indicated at the beginning of this lecture, much of the
initial impetus for the creation of a world court was the desire to
establish a forum for the resolution of specific disputes. When the
58 Sean D. Murphy, The International Court of Justice, in THE RULES, PRACTICE, AND
JURISPRUDENCE OF INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND TRIBUNALS 11, 35 (Chiara Giorgetti ed.,
2012).
59 Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Ger. v. It.: Greece Intervening), Judgment (Feb.
3, 2012), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docketfiles/143/16883.pdf.
6 Id. 70.
61 The ICJ referred to such evidence of U.S. practice in the Jurisdictional Immunities
case. See Jurisdictional Immunities of the State, supra note 59, 72.
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Court settles those disputes, however, as when it renders advisory
opinions, the Court shapes international law more broadly. It is
through this combination of functions that the ICJ acquires
potency as a force in international law.
The World Court is unique because it has the scope to perform
these functions with respect to all substantive aspects of
international law, in cases arising in all regions of the world, and in
response to requests from the Security Council and General
Assembly. In addition, this broad mandate resides in a body that is
the principal judicial organ of the United Nations. All members of
the United Nations elect the judges of the World Court, and those
judges are accountable to the world community, not to the
particular disputants or to their home countries. Because the Court
is the UN's principal judicial organ, its judgments have a special
stature. We saw in the Cameroon-Nigeria example how the parties
and other international actors can make use of such a judgment to
bring about the peaceful resolution of a particular dispute. And we
saw in the Germany v. Italy case how a judgment also can have a
broader law-making function. No other court combines the
mandate and the institutional position enjoyed by the World Court.
I have referred here to the "potency" of the ICJ, and I chose that
word deliberately because a medicine can be potent, but so can a
poison. There are observers who would label the Court as one or
the other. As I mentioned earlier, some U.S. scholars are highly
critical of the Court, charging it with bias and ineffectiveness. I
contrast this perspective with that of a young Bosnian who once
described to me in a very moving way the importance to her
country of the Court's 2007 decision that the former Yugoslavia
had violated international law by failing to prevent acts of
genocide in Srebrenica. 62 I hope that this lecture has provided a
foundation for each member of the audience to begin to formulate
his or her own views regarding the role of the World Court.
When members of the audience consider the work of the ICJ, I
urge you to keep in mind the framework for evaluation that I have
62 Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v. Serb. & Montenegro), 2007 I.C.J. 43, 238 (Feb. 26), available at
http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/91/13685.pdf.
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suggested today, taking account of the combination of functions
reposed in the Court, as well as the Court's position within an
international legal system that is very different from national
legal systems. As I mentioned earlier, international law has
changed enormously in the thirty years since I graduated from law
school.63 Nonetheless, the field remains a decentralized and rather
disorderly system of norms and institutions. I do not mean this as
a criticism. To the contrary, this decentralization and diffusion
creates the opportunity for those of us who work as international
lawyers-whether as judges, government lawyers, representatives
of non-governmental organizations, professors, or counsel to
international investors. We are not astronomers studying stars
through a telescope; we are active participants in the shaping of
the field. I hope that each of you will bear this in mind as you
pursue your own interest in the field.
63 See supra notes 32-36 and accompanying text.

